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Do They Want to Regulate Online Profiling?
Laura Garcia Vargas*
‘‘Bottom line: More personal information, more money. It is a valid business
model, the one that gives us, in return, access to Internet largely free of
monetary charges. But it is a tricky one: personal information becomes not
only a currency but the currency. The entire business model rests upon the
amount and precision of personal information collected.”1
Abstract
Online profiling or behavioural tracking is the process by which private
companies track and gather data about users’ activities in online platforms. The
data collected by all the companies is aggregated with the purpose of creating a
comprehensive profile about users. Since at least 15 years ago, there have been
several attempts to regulate online profiling in order to reduce its privacy
implications. In general, these regulations have tried to limit the way the
information is used, the type of data that is collected, and impose or suggest the
security standards that the companies should take to protect it.
This article will demonstrate that the proposed regulations do not reduce online
profiling’s privacy repercussions. In addition, it will argue that in order to reduce
privacy repercussions it is necessary to regulate the aggregation and
commercialization of the data. However, governments, industries, and users may
not have enough incentives to find alternative methods or effective regulations to
address the problems raised by online profiling.
INTRODUCTION
The tracking of individuals’ activities is an old practice. Even before the
digital era, companies tracked their customers to understand and analyze their
behaviour in order to design better marketing campaigns. With the invention of
the computer, and later the internet, it became easier to track customers, to keep
a record of the tracking, and to analyze the data. Moreover, it became possible
and easy to share the data with other companies in order to understand better the
behaviour of a particular individual.
Due to new technologies, an old practice used by companies to improve their
marketing campaigns, now is the one of the major sources of personal data
collection and creation of databases. As technology advances, not only does the
* PhD Candidate at the Faculty of Law, University of Ottawa
1 Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, ‘‘Speech: Online Behavioural Advertis-
ing –Putting aNormativeFrameworkAroundaBusinessModel – January 21, 2014” (10
March 2014), online: <www.priv.gc.ca/media/sp-d/2014/sp-d_20140121_cb_e.asp>.
tracking become easier, but the information collected by companies becomes
more precise and more revealing of the private life of the tracked customer.
Right now there is an industry around personal information. There are
hundreds of companies making profits from the personal information of online
platforms users. For some of the companies the business is to track users across
different platforms, for others is to facilitate the aggregation, and for others is to
gain some type of advantage by using that information. The tracking of the
online behaviour of the users of online platforms is called online profiling or
behavioural tracking.2
This paper will explain the practice of online profiling by dividing it in five
stages: (1) installation of the technology, (2) tracking of the users, (3) collection
of the data in private databases, (4) aggregation of the data, and (5) use of the
profiles created after the aggregation of the data. Graphic 1 illustrates these
stages and highlights some of the problems that arise in each of them.
Online profiling arise several privacy implications for the personal
information of the online platform users. Policy makers in the United States,
Canada, and the European Union have attempted to regulate this practice to
reduce the threat to privacy that it represents. Nevertheless, these attempts of
regulation have not been successful. The main problem that policy makers have
identified is the lack of transparency and users’ knowledge with which this
practice occurs. Consequently, most of the proposed regulations have focused in
making the practice more transparent, informing the users, and asking for the
users’ consent. Nevertheless, the biggest threat to privacy and the real value of
the practice is in the aggregation of the data. Nonetheless, policy makers have
not defined the aggregation as the focus of the problem, and the solutions
proposed do not affect this stage.
This article will argue two main points. First, in order to reduce the privacy
repercussion created by online profiling it is necessary to directly regulate the
aggregation and commercialization of the data. Second, the data collected and
aggregated represent important benefits to all stakeholders, for this reason there
are no incentives to regulate online profiling in order to reduce its real threat to
privacy.
This paper will have four sections. Section I will expose the stakeholders
involved, and the benefits of the practice. Section II will explain each of the five
2 For the purpose of this paper, online platforms refer to computer browsers,
smartphones, tablets, or any device used to connect to the internet.
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stages of online profiling, the problems that arise in each of them and the
solution proposed to regulate those problem. Section III will argue that to really
protect the online platforms users’ from privacy threats it is necessary to redefine
what is the problem of online profiling. Section IV will analyze if the
government, the industry and the users have any incentive to regulate the
online profiling practice.
I. ONLINE PROFILING: HOW IT WORKS
By monitoring online behaviour over time, companies collect enough
information about an individual (or a specific device) to create a unique digital
profile. The creation of comprehensive personal profiles is the main justification
of online profiling. In this process, some actors gather the data, others aggregate
it, and finally someone buys it mainly for marketing. As Deibert argues:
‘‘companies of all shapes and sizes systematically pick through our digital
droppings, collating them, passing them around, inspecting them, and feeding
them back to us. And this market shows no sign of slowing.”3 This section will
analyze who are the main stakeholders and what are the benefits of online
profiling.
In the online environment, there are different technologies that enable a
communication between the users’ devices and tracking companies. Due to this
communication first- and third-party companies can follow the user within and
between online platforms and/or different physical locations. Depending on the
technology used, the company is able to gather different types of information
about a user or device.4 This information might be associated to a specific device
or to the identity of an individual. The data that each of the technologies gathers
alone may not represent a big threat to privacy, however the information from
several of these technologies creates the possibility of producing a very
comprehensive profile.
Different organizations participate in the tracking, collection, aggregation
and use of the users’ information. Based on the interaction with the users, it is
possible to divide them in two categories: first and third party.5 The first-party
organizations interact directly with users, because they own the apps and service
that the user accesses (e.g. retail and content sites, search engines, third-party
payment services, social networks, and weather apps). They have a contractual
3 Ronald J Deibert, Black Code. Surveillance, Privacy, and the Dark Side of the Internet,
Trade paperback ed. (Toronto, Ontario: McClelland & Steward, 2013) at 56.
4 See e.g. Officer of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, ‘‘Report on the 2010 Office of
the Privacy Commissioner of Canada’s Consultation on Online Tracking, Profiling and
Targeting, and Cloud Computing”, (May 2011), online:<www.priv.gc.ca/media/1961/
report_201105_e.pdf > at 12.
5 See e.g. Tracy A. Steindel, ‘‘Path toward User Control of Online Profiling” (2011) 17:2
Mich Telecomm & Tech L Rev 459 at 465.
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relation with the user based on the Terms of Use and the Privacy Policy of the
company.6
On the other hand, the third-party organizations lack a consumer interface,
however they have access to the users’ online data. Some of these companies
track the users; others aggregate, analyze, sell, or buy the users’ data (e.g. agency
trading desks, data suppliers, ad networks, banks, governments, law
enforcement, and lawyers).7
Online profiling has benefits for users and companies.8 For example,
targeting advertising supports ‘‘free” (or low monetary cost) access to online
services and content.9 In addition, the tracking and the information collected
help to improve the commercial relation between users and companies. For
instance, it improves the user experience by making the experience more
personalized by showing relevant search results based on the web history of the
user, and displaying advertising based on frequently visited sites and geo-
location;10 improves the quality of the services of the company and helps with
developing new products; 11 secures and protects the users’ personal accounts, by
letting the company know if someone different from the account owner tries to
access the account.12
Furthermore, it has marketing benefits for the companies as it enables
companies to classify the individuals into groups based on specific
characteristics. This classification is useful because it allows audience targeting
which facilitates specific and more efficient marketing actions. 13
6 The Privacy Policy stipulates how the companywill manage the information they collect
from the user. For example, what information they collect and why they collect it, how
they use that information, and how to access and update the personal information. See
for example Google, ‘‘Google Privacy Policy”, (20 December 2013), Google Policies &
Principles, online: <www.google.ca/intl/en/policies/privacy/>.
7 See e.g. Julia Angwin, ‘‘TheWeb’s New GoldMine: Your Secrets”,Wall Street Journal
( 3 0 J u l y 2 0 1 0 ) , o n l i n e : < w w w . w s j . c o m / n e w s / a r t i c l e s /
SB10001424052748703940904575395073512989404>.
8 Recent events as the Snowden revelations show that it might have some benefits for the
government as well.
9 See e.g. Grand Gross, ‘‘Survey: Internet users like targeted ads, free content”,
Computerworld (19 April 2013), online: <www.computerworld.com/s/article/
9238549/Survey_Internet_users_like_targeted_ads_free_content?pageNumber=1>.
10 See for example Google, ‘‘Ads You’ll FindaMost Useful”, online: <www.google.com/
intl/en/policies/privacy/example/ads-youll-find-most-useful.html>.
11 See e.g. Google, ‘‘Develop New Ones”, online: <www.google.com/intl/en/policies/
privacy/example/develop-new-ones.html>.
12 See for example ‘‘Cookies, Pixels & Similar Technologies”, online: <www.facebook.-
com/help/cookies/?ref=sitefooter>;See alsoGoogle, ‘‘ProtectGoogle andOurUsers”,
online: <www.google.com/intl/en/policies/privacy/example/protect-google-and-our-
users.html>.
13 See e.g. Daniel J Solove, ‘‘Privacy and Power: Computer Databases andMetaphors for
Information Privacy” (2001) 53:6 Stan L Rev 1393 at 1405.
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II. STAGES, PROBLEMS, AND PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
As shown in Graphic 1 at the beginning of this paper, the online profiling
process is divided in five stages. This section will briefly explain each of the
stages. Then it will highlight some of the problems that arise in each of them.
Finally, it will expose some of the solutions proposed by policy makers in order
to mitigate the threat to privacy.14 Specifically, this section will focus on three
concerns: the knowledge and consent of the user, the type of information
collected, and the security measures to store and share the data. The aim of this
section is to give a general panorama; it does not aim to give an extensive report
about current problems and proposed solutions.
(a) Installation of the Technology
In this stage, companies install one or several of the available tracking
technologies in the user’s device.15 The moment when this occurs varies; it can be
as soon as the person opens a website, when the app is installed or when the
device is fabricated (e.g. cookies, web beacons, and GPS).
Other technologies such as IP address, Unique Device Identifier, or browsing
fingerprinting do not need previous installation. In these cases, the architecture
of the online platform or the device allows the tracking of the user without
installing an extra technology on the device.16 For example, every time a
computer is connected to a website its IP address is retrieved.17 In this stage, the
two main problems regarding privacy are: the user does not about the existence,
installation, and use of the technologies; and the lack and/or the validity of the
consent given by the user regarding the installation of those technologies.
Three of the main proposed solutions are: (1) companies must inform the
users about the installation and use of technologies and ask for their consent; (2)
companies must give the user an option to opt-out; and (3) the creation of a Do
Not Track mechanism. The main problem of those solutions is that even if
companies are transparent and inform the user about the use of the technologies
and the collection of the data, the user will never have the knowledge and tools
necessary to make an informed decision.18
14 This includes mainly policy makers from United States, Canada, and the European
Union. The paper will not focus on any specific proposal as the different jurisdictions
have approach the problem with the same or similar solutions.
15 Device includes web browsers, computer hard drives, smartphones, tablets, etc.
16 Here architecture is use Lessig’s definition: ‘‘The software and hardware that make
cyberspace what it is constitute a set of constraints on how you can behave. . .. They
constrain some behavior by making other behavior possible or impossible. The code
embeds certain values or makes certain values impossible.” Lawrence Lessig, Code 2.0
(New York, United States of America: Basic Books) at 124–125.
17 See e.g. Mozilla, ‘‘Privacy on the Internet”, online: <www.mozilla.org/projects/
security/pki/psm/help_21/privacy_help.html>.
18 Moreover, when the companies are transparent they only inform the user about a small
part of the technologies: cookies, web beacons, and GPS.
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Due to the aggregation of the data that companies do, the user will not be
able to foresee what the data collected by that particular company would truly
reveal. The data collected often has other uses besides the initial uses described
by the Privacy Policy. This data might have secondary uses by first-party
organization, or by third-party organizations (or individuals). 19 Even if some of
the potential uses are explain to the user, not all are foreseeable by the user when
he is giving his consent. In other words, when the user is giving his consent, he
cannot really valorize what he is giving away or what he is authorizing. 20
(b) Tracking
In this stage, companies follow the user’s online activities and keep a record
of that data. As previously explained, the data that companies can collect
include: what did the user see, for how long, her search queries, information
provided to the website, and her geo-location, among others. In this stage, the
main concerns are: the places where these technologies can follow the users, and
that the type of information collected constitutes personally identifiable
information (PII).21
Technologies can follow the user through different online sites and physical
places. Regarding online sites, the user is followed within each website he or she
visits, and through different website he or she browses. Apropos the physical
places, with the invention of GPS technology, and its installation in personal
devices such as mobile phones, automobiles, and cameras, it became easier to
collect data regarding the actual geo-location of the user.22
The main solution regarding the type of information collected has been to
limit the collection of data only to non-PII.23 The first problem of this solution is
the definition of what is personal information. The question about what
information to protect against a privacy invasion does not have a unique
answer.24 Therefore, achieving a consensus about this category is the first
challenge.
19 In addition, only first party organizations can inform and ask for the user’s consent.
Third party organizations do not have a direct interaction with the user, then how are
they going to inform the user and ask for his consent?
20 See e.g. Solove, supra note 13 at 1452.
21 With the concept of PII it is also included the concepts ‘‘sensitive information” and
‘‘personal information”.
22 Other technologies that help determine the geolocation of the user are Base StationData
and WIFI. See Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 13/2011 on
Geolocation Services on Smart Mobile Devices, 811/11/ENWP 185 (2011).
23 See e.g. Paul M Schwartz & Daniel J Solove, ‘‘The PII Problem: Privacy and a New
Concept of Personally Identifiable Information” (2011) 86 NYUL Rev 1814 at 1816:
PII is one of the most central concepts in privacy regulation. It defines the scope and boundaries
of a large range of privacy statutes and regulations . . . These laws all share the same basic
assumption-that in the absence of PII, there is no privacy harm. Thus, privacy regulation focuses
on the collection, use, and disclosure of PII, and leaves non-PII unregulated.
24 For example there is not one clear definition of what personal information is. According
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The second problem, and the main reason why this solution is not enough to
protect privacy, is that technology has made it possible to combine data to reveal
more information. In other words, ‘‘[t]he line between PII and non-PII is not
fixed, but depends upon technology.”25 Several studies have shown how
information that is classified as non-PII in combination with more data allows
the identification and disclosure of non-public information of the data subject.
For example, the combination of ZIP, birth date, and sex can uniquely identify
87% of the U.S. population;26 an analysis of the movie viewing history and
movie ratings of a person, can reveal non-public sensitive information such as
religion, sexual preferences and political views;27 and the possibility to predict the
Social Security Number of a person base on his birth date and birth location.28
(c) Collection in Databases
In this stage, the companies collect the data gathered during the tracking in
private databases. These databases contain individual files about the users of the
online platforms. Those individual files might be associated to a specific device,
or to the identity of a person (user name or real name). Current technology
makes it possible and inexpensive to store vast amounts of data for an indefinite
period. This is problematic from a privacy perspective because it creates the
possibility to have more comprehensive and unforgettable personal profiles.
With this in mind, the main concerns of this stage are the time the data is stored
and the access to the database records.
To reduce the privacy threat of the information collected, it has been
established that the data must be de-identified before it is stored and shared.29
Thus, companies use different anonymization techniques to protect the privacy
of the users.30 This is not an accurate solution to privacy because, due to
to Schwartz & Solove, there are three different approaches: ‘‘tautological”, ‘‘non-
public”, and ‘‘specific-types”. See Ibid at 1828.
25 Supra note 23 at 1846.
26 See Latanya Sweeney, ‘‘Policy andLaw: Identifiability ofDe-identifiedData”,Research
Accomplishements of Latanya Sweeney, online: <www.latanyasweeney.org/work/
identifiability.html>.
27 See A. Narayanan & V. Shmatikov, Robust De-anonymization of Large Sparse Datasets
(2008), online: <www.cs.utexas.edu/~shmat/shmat_oak08netflix.pdf>
28 See Alessandro Acquisti, Ralph Gross & Stephen E. Fienberg, ‘‘Predicting Social
Security Numbers from Public Data” 106:27 Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences of theUnited States ofAmerica 10975 (2009), online:<www.pnas.org/content/
106/27/10975.full.pdf>
29 See e.g. US, Federal Trade Commission,ProtectingConsumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid
Change: Recommendations For Businesses and Policymakers (2012) at 22, online:
<www.ftc.gov/reports/protecting-consumer-privacy-era-rapid-change-recommenda-
tions-businesses-policymakers>
30 ‘‘Anonymization is a process bywhich information in a database ismanipulated tomake
it difficult to identify data subjects.” Paul Ohm, ‘‘Broken Promises of Privacy:
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technological advances and the proliferation of personal information stored in
online and offline databases, the re-identification process is possible and easy to
perform.31
(d) Aggregation of the Data: Creation of a Comprehensive Profile
In this stage, companies exchange the data collected in their private database
with other companies in order to aggregate and transform it into a
comprehensive profile. For instance, if company A has a dataset regarding the
shopping preferences of the IP 12.345.678.90 and company B has a dataset of the
movie preferences associate to that same IP, in this stage those datasets are
aggregated to create a more comprehensive profile of the IP 12.345.678.90.32
The datasets are exchanged by two processes: shared between subsidiaries of
the same company, or traded for money in different data marketplaces.33 The
problems that arise from this stage are the commercialization of the data and the
creation of comprehensive profiles. Until now, none of these problems has been
part of the regulatory discussion around online profiling.
The commercialization of the data is a problem because it leads to the
devaluation of the privacy into companies’ assets. If privacy is transformed into
companies’ assets, and that transformation is accepted, this will affect how the
courts will interpret and protect privacy in the future. This is also a problem
about the values that society and courts should preserve and protect, or in the
words of Lessig, this is a question of ‘‘how should changes in technology be
accommodated to preserve values from an earlier context in a new context?”34
Look at the following example: two strangers (X and Y) follow one person
around the city every day. X follows the individual in the zone around his work
and Y in the zone around his home. Both X and Y take notes, pictures and
videos of the individual’s activities, then they sell those records to a third person
— C. This situation is stalking and constitutes an invasion of privacy. It is
problematic not only because the person is being followed, but also because X
and Y are keeping a record of his activities (personal life), and making a profit
from that invasion to privacy. As this situation takes place in the real world,
society will likely oppose this action and courts will protect the individual’s
privacy from this type of action.
Responding to the Surprising Failure of Anonymization” (2010) 57 UCLA L Rev 1703
at 1707.
31 See e.g. Schwartz & Solove, supra note 23 at 1846. See also Ohm, ibid at 1705.
32 See Dan Wallach, ‘‘The Technological Landscape of Comprehensive Data Collection”




33 See for example: BlueKai, ‘‘BlueKai Intro Video”, online: <http://bluekai.com/video/
>. See also Angwin, supra note 7.
34 Lessig, supra note 16 at 191.
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Online profiling practice is not different from the previous example. It is then
necessary to think what consequences does the acceptance of the
commercialization of data collected online by private companies have in the
concept of privacy in the physical world, and in the social (and legal) values
around privacy.
The other problem that arises in this stage is the creation of comprehensive
profiles. This represents an invasion to privacy because online platform users lose
the control over their personal information.35 Assuming that the consent given
by the user to a company is valid, in this stage the information that the user
agreed to share with one company, is shared with others companies. This means
that one company not only gathers the information that the user wanted to
‘‘share”, but much more.
In addition, the creation of comprehensive profiles is a constant threat to
privacy because the profiles contain enough information to individualize a
person; to know daily patterns about that person, and to make predictions about
that person. As Solove states, ‘‘[t]he data collected [by corporations] extends
beyond information about consumer’s view of the product to information about
the consumer herself, often including lifestyle details and even a full-scale
psychological profile.”36
Therefore, it is a constant threat because those profiles are stored and
available to anyone who can gain access to it (whether authorized or
unauthorized). This is problematic because not only could anyone access those
files and learn almost everything about a person, but also because the potential
uses that those profiles could have.
(e) Use of the Data: Profile Application
In this stage, different organizations use the comprehensive profiles for
different purposes, such as online advertising; target marketing; background
checking; law enforcement investigation; price targeting; personalized
promotions; statistical purposes, and in predictive profiling systems. The
comprehensive profiles contain enough information and characteristics to
make inferences about a person (or device), for example, she likes movies,
understands French, reads newspapers from Middle East countries, buys coffee
at Starbucks, and lives in Toronto.
The division of the profiles by group is a useful tool for organizations in
order to deliver marketing campaigns that are more precise. It is worth
highlighting that the content that the user accesses online is selected by the
company that provides it, as this content is chosen depending on the preferences
of the user, and the user will only see what the company thinks is more
35 In this regard Steindel affirms, ‘‘online profiling is a harmful practice precisely because it
is contrary to traditional concepts of privacy and user expectations, which both reflect
the belief that privacy includes some measure of control over personal information.”
Steindel, supra note 5 at 468.
36 Solove, supra note 13 at 1404.
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appropriate for his profile. Consequently, the classification by group limits the
options of the user .37
Another possible set of groups are people with homosexual preferences;
people with Islam interests; people with interest in arms and bombs, and
pregnant women. This set of groups might also be useful for marketing purposes.
Nevertheless, depending on the purpose that the organization wants to achieve, it
can also be used for discriminatory practices based on sexual preferences and
religious beliefs, in unfair treatment due to pregnancy, or to profile possible
terrorists.38
The problems that arise from this stage are the classification of people in
specific groups, and the uses of the profiles. As with the aggregation stage, policy
makers have not discussed these problems as the discussion has mainly focused
on the targeting advertising industry. The online profiling problem has been
defined as if the information gathered is only used by this industry.
Nevertheless, scholars have examined the problems of online profiling
beyond the advertising industry. Some of them have made some propositions to
limit the potential uses that the comprehensive profiles might have. For example,
Solove proposed to establish ‘‘meaningful limits on how data can be used —
limits that are clear rather that ambiguous and amorphous.”39
The main problem of this solution is that today’s technology makes it
possible, and easy, to access the databases where the profiles are stored by
different actors (internal and external to the companies).40 Even if there is a
regulation that prohibits certain uses, it will not persuade actors like hackers.
Therefore, it will not prevent the access and unauthorized use of the profiles.
Moreover, this type of regulation probably will not apply to government
agencies that have their own regulation, such as the NSA that, as it will be
discuss later, also have interests in these profiles.
37 See Steindel, supra note 5 at 469.
38 For example See IanKerr, ‘‘Prediction, Preemption, Presumption:ThePathofLawafter
the Computational Turn” in Privacy, Due Process and the Computational Turn: The
Philosophy of LawMeets the Philosophy of Technology (New York: Routledge, 2013) at
8. See also Ronald Leenes, ‘‘Do They KnowMe? Deconstructing Identifiability” (2007)
4:1&2 UOLTJ 135 at 158.
39 Solove, supra note 13 at 1461.
40 Examples of those breaches include the breach to the smartphone app Snapchat on
January 1, 2014,where the hacker accessed the list of usernames andphonenumbers, and
the breach to Boxee.tv forum accounts on April 2, 2014, where the information accessed
by the hackers included email addresses, birth dates, IP addresses,message histories, and
password changes. See Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, ‘‘Chronology of Data Breaches”,
online: < www.privacyrights.org/data-breach/new>. See also Dino Grandoni, ‘‘4.6
Million Snapchat Accounts Leaked After Startup Brushed Off Security Concern”, The
Huffington Post (1 January 2014), online: <www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/01/01/
snapchat-leak_n_4528573.html>.
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III. RETHINKING THE PROBLEM
This paper has exposed that the online profiling practice creates a constant
threat to the privacy of online platform users. Even if the user gives his consent
for the collection of the information, the commercialization of the data, the
aggregation process and the security vulnerabilities of the databases where all the
data is stored, poses a threat to the privacy of the person. All of these justify the
need for a regulatory intervention of the online profiling practice.
This section will argue that the way the problem has been defined by policy
makers is not accurate to protect the privacy of the users. Therefore, it is
necessary to redefine the problem in order to design regulations that effectively
reduce the privacy concerns of online profiling.
The objective of the current approach is to reduce the threat to privacy
created by online profiling by regulating the first three stages of the process. For
instance, inform the user about tracking technologies and the collection of
information; ask for consent; limit the type of information that is gathered, and
guarantee that the data collected is not associated to an indefinable person.
This approach has proven to be ideal to ensure the delivering of the benefits
described at the beginning of this paper to all stakeholders, including
technological commodities to users. Nevertheless, for the reasons developed in
the previous section, these regulations do not reduce the constant threat to
privacy that online profiling creates.
Re-identification methods, proliferation of personal information online and
offline, and the possibility of identifying people from non-PII data, are examples
of technological factors that policy makers must take into consideration in the
design of regulations. In addition, it is also important that they take into account
the main objective of online profiling; this is the creation of comprehensive
personal profiles. 41
According to Ohm, ‘‘the utility and privacy of data are linked, and so long as
data is useful, even in the slightest, then it is also potentially re-identifiable . . .
[a]s the utility of data increases even a little, the privacy plummets.”42 Thus, as
the data collected in the process of online profiling must be useful as to create
comprehensive profiles, the data collected will always be a threat to privacy.
Consequently, regulating online profiling by concentrating in the type of the data
collected, will never lead to the abolition of the creation of comprehensive
profiles.
Taking into account the technological factors and the online profiling
justification, no matter how the first three stages are regulated, the result is going
to be the same: the aggregation process will be performed, the comprehensives
profiles will be created, and they will be available for someone to use. In other
words, the threat to privacy will persist.
41 See e.g. Solove, supra note 13 at 1407: ‘‘[t]he effectiveness and profitability of targeted
marketing depends upon data, and the challenge is to obtain as much of it as possible.”
42 Ohm, supra note 30 at 1751.
DO THEY WANT TO REGULATE ONLINE PROFILING? 79
As explained in the previous section, a regulation limiting the uses of the
profiles is not an efficient solution to reduce the threat to privacy. A more
accurate approach is to understand that the constant threat to privacy exists due
to (1) the aggregation and commercialization of the data, (2) the creation of
comprehensive profiles, (3) the storage of those profiles in databases, and (4) the
application of those profiles. Therefore, the new regulatory proposals should
center in the aggregation stage and the storage of the information.
However, if the goal is to eliminate the threat to privacy created by online
profiling, regulating some of the stages of the practice will not be enough. As
long as companies keep tracking and aggregating the data, the threat to privacy
will persist. Therefore, there should be more efforts to find alternative business
methods to achieve a real balance between privacy, innovation and economical
growth. In order words, to eliminate the negative implications, it is necessary to
rethink the industry and business model of online profiling in order to find new
alternatives.
Lessig argues that four constraints act as regulators: law, social norms,
market, and architecture.43 Lessig’s proposals are an example that there are ways
to regulate online profiling besides regulations. Nevertheless, it is necessary that
the relevant stakeholders have incentives in order to find alternative methods or
effective regulations to address the problems raised by online profiling and
implement them.
IV. ARE THERE INCENTIVES TO REGULATE?
The four constraints exposed by Lessig also indicates that the government is
not the only actor who can regulate an issue; the private sector and the users also
have the power to regulate. Therefore, in order to regulate online profiling, it is
necessary for the intervention of the industry and, more importantly, of the
users. An additional question to ask is whether those actors have incentives to
intervene and regulate this practice. This section will analyze what are the
incentives, if any, that these groups may have to regulate the online profiling
practice to change or affect the creation of databases with comprehensive
profiles.
(a) Government
The existence of the databases created by the online profiling practice by
private sector companies is a gold mine for law enforcement and intelligence
agents. Under national security, crime prevention or crime investigation,
governments from around the globe want to have access to those databases,
and they have found the way in.44 Governments use data mining techniques to
43 See Lessig, supra note 16, c. 7.
44 Deibert argues, ‘‘[a]s more and more data is entrusted by users to third parties like
Google, governments are side-stepping transparent and accountable judicial processes
to police that data.” See Deibert, supra note 3 at 115.
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extract intelligence from vast stores of digital information.45 The existence of the
databases created through the online profiling process benefits these techniques.
As Rubinstein explains, data mining ‘‘can be viewed as a ‘back end’ use of
personal data that is already collected and resident in public and private sector
databases.”46
Furthermore, the recent Snowden revelations is proof of the interest that
government agencies have to gather information of people (online platforms
users) and that the databases created by companies through online profiling are
the perfect source to find that personal information, e.g. NSA Prism program
that tapped into user data of Apple, Google, and others.47
As those databases are of great utility for crime investigations, crime
prevention and national security, governments do not have incentives to regulate.
On the contrary, governments have incentives not to regulate and to maintain
and preserve the practice of online profiling as it is today. The creations of the
databases are a benefit for them.
(b) Industry
The personal information of online platform users is a big business. In this
business, online profiling is one of the practices used by private companies to
collect the information. This process involves the participation of many
companies.48 The collection of users’ information began as a method to
facilitate and improve commerce by improving the effectiveness of targeted
marketing. This business method helped to shape the actual architecture of the
market. Being so, the industry has the power and tools to regulate the practice;
invent new technologies; change the architecture of the technologies used in
order to make those technologies less invasive to privacy, or define a new
business method that does not depend on the collection of data and the creation
of comprehensive profiles.
Nevertheless, various industries benefit from the existence of this business
model based on online profiling practices, and these industries are growing every
day.49 Besides the benefits exposed at the beginning of this document, online
profiling represents a huge economical benefit for these companies.50
45 See Ira S. Rubinstein, Ronald D. Lee & Paul M. Schwartz, ‘‘Data Mining and Internet
Profiling: Emerging Regulatory and Technological Approaches” (2008) 75:01 U
Chicago L R 261.
46 Ibid at 280.
47 Varton Gellman & Ashkan Soltani, ‘‘NSA infiltrates links to Yahoo, Google data




48 See e.g Solove, supra note 13 at 1407.
49 For example, in 2010 a newspaper article report, ‘‘Tracking activity is exploding.
Researchers at AT&T Labs andWorcester Polytechnic Institute last fall found tracking
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Due to the fact that a great number of companies are involved in the online
profiling process and all of them benefit from it, industry also does not have the
incentives to regulate or change the actual practice of online profiling.
(c) Users
Online profiling jeopardizes the privacy of the users. Consequently, users
have a huge incentive to regulate this practice. Based on the regulators proposed
by Lessig, users could use privacy tools to make tracking harder, e.g. Ghostery;
use tools that improve privacy and security over the internet to make the data
collected less accurate, e.g. TOR; or change some browser habits to reduce the
amount of personal information available online, e.g. private information posted
in social networks.
Nevertheless, two facts demonstrate that for the majority of the users,
privacy is not enough incentive to do something regarding online profiling. The
first fact is that online profiling has been a public practice for a long time. For
instance, in 1999, The New York Times published an article talking about the
tracking of consumers, the collection of personal data, and the sharing of that
data between companies. 51 This newspaper article is a good example of two
things.
First, The New York Times article demonstrates that online profiling is not a
practice developed in the dark. One thing is the companies’ lack of transparency
with the user at the moment of the ‘‘contractual” agreement; another is the fact
that the practice has been public for a long time, and the majority of the users
have not changed their behaviour online.
Second, the article also argues that consumers ‘‘are willing to part with
personal information as long as they get something in return.”52 The companies
gather personal information and give something in return, e.g. free content,
promotions, and technological commodities). This statement remains true
nowadays, and helps explain why users have not done anything.
The second fact is the Snowden revelations. As noted previously, these
revelations demonstrated that, by accessing the databases of private companies,
government gathered tons of personal information about people. Nevertheless,
technology on 80% of 1,000 popular sites, up from 40% of those sites in 2005.”: see
Angwin, supra note 7.
50 MarketingCharts staff, ‘‘B2BMedia and Info Industry Revenues Up 3.4% in 2012”, (24
May 2013), online: <www.marketingcharts.com/wp/traditional/b2b-media-and-info-
industry-revenues-up-3-4-in-2012-29788/>. See also MarketingCharts staff, ‘‘Online
Ad Revenues Up 18% Y-O-Y in H1; Mobile’s Share Doubles to 15%”, (10 October
2013), online: <www.marketingcharts.com/wp/online/online-ad-revenues-up-18-y-o-
y-in-h1-mobiles-share-doubles-to-15-37306/>. See also Deibert, supra note 3 at 57.
51 Katie Hafner, ‘‘Do You Know Who’s Watching You? Do You Care?, The New York
Times (11 November 1999), online: <www.nytimes.com/1999/11/11/technology/do-
you-know-who-s-watching-you-do-you-care.html>.
52 Ibid.
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people do not seem to make the connection of the privacy threat between
government agencies, spying citizens, and private companies gathering and
storing files of personal information about their users.
All the previous information demonstrates that it might be some kind of
technological somnambulism around online profiling.53 Companies improve
technologies to give the user more innovation, and users accept that innovation
without really questioning (or understanding) what are the true consequences of
these new technologies. Then, even when privacy is a big incentive to regulate
online profiling, for now it seems to be not big enough for the users to do
something about it.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We are being stalked around the web, and our data collected has become a
profit asset for private companies and a gold mine for everyone who needs or
wants to get personal information about us. This paper has argued that in order
to reduce the privacy repercussion created by online profiling, it is necessary to
regulate the aggregation and commercialization of the all the data collected by
private companies using tracking technologies.
Second, based on the benefits that private companies and government gain
from the aggregation of the data, these stakeholders do not have any incentives
to regulate. The other relevant stakeholder are the users, taking into account that
online profiling threats the privacy that affects directly the life of users, this
group should have enough incentives to regulate online profiling. However, there
has not been any significant regulation coming from this group after at least 15
years of the existence of the practice.
The absence of regulation can be for two reasons. First, users enjoy the
benefits they receive in exchange of their information so much that they are
willing to give up their privacy. Second, users do not understand the implications
or the magnitude of what they are giving away. The most probable is the second
reason, then the only thing needed is a big event that helps users connect the dots,
for example between events such as the Snowden revelation and the
authorization they give to companies to track them through online platforms.
Finally, today we are allowing first and third parties to track our ‘‘online
habits” but as technology evolves information gatherers will be able to track
other information more closely related to our personal life. For this reason, the
ideal objective is to eliminate the threat to privacy created by online profiling. To
achieve this goal, regulating some of the stages of the practice will not be enough.
It is necessary to replace the actual business models by practices that do not
53 See LangdonWinner, TheWhale and the Reactor: A Search for Limits in an Age of High
Technology (The University of Chicago Press, 1989) at 10: ‘‘A more revealing notion, in
myview, is that of technological somnambulism.For the interesting puzzle in our times is
that we so willingly sleepwalk through the process of reconstituting the conditions of
human existence”.
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require or depend on the gathering, aggregating and storing of personal data. If it
is not possible to find any alternatives, then as a society we must ask if the
economical profit gained by some private companies and the technological
innovation that online profiling practice promises to achieve are more valuable
than our privacy.
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